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11. INTRODUCTION
The type of price setting mechanism to use is a major issue in the speci￿cation of
any macroeconomic model. Time-dependent price setting mechanisms, like the ones
proposed by Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983), are often used due to their simplicity. In
its basic version, the model proposed by Taylor (1980) implies that the share of prices
that changes each period is constant. Cecchetti (1985, p: 940) termed this the uniform
nonsynchronization (UNS) hypothesis.1
Even if simple time-dependent price setting mechanisms characterized by UNS do not
provide a valid description of the whole economy, it might be the case that the fraction of
prices that change every period varies little over time. In this situation, macroeconomic
models based on the UNS hypothesis may lead to results that do not di⁄er much from
the ones obtained using state-dependent price setting schemes.
This idea is explored by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005). These authors have devised a
statistic which can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of UNS, and compared the
results of a model using time-dependent price setting with the results of a state-dependent
model calibrated to produce a value of their statistic similar to that found using the USA
data. The results of Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) suggest that the di⁄erences between
the two models are negligible.
Although the line of research pioneered by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) is potentially
very fruitful, the results depend critically on the way the importance of time-dependent
price setting schemes is measured. In this paper, we argue that some caution is needed
in the use of the statistic proposed by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) as a measure of the
degree of UNS. Furthermore, we build on the work of Dias, Marques, Neves and Santos
Silva (2005) to propose an alternative way to measure the signi￿cance of UNS.
It is important to realize that all the statistics considered here measure only the
importance of price-setting rules implying UNS. Therefore, they provide no information
1Uniform nonsynchronization is also termed uniform staggering (see, for instance, Fisher and
Konieczny, 2000), uniform price staggering (see, Dias et al., 2005) or perfect staggering (see, for in-
stance, Aucremanne and Dhyne, 2004).
2on the importance of other forms of time-dependent price setting rules. On the other
hand, it is also important to point out that, even if these statistics indicate that UNS
provides a good description of the price setting rules in the economy, that does not
mean that indeed time-dependent rules are used. What matters is that, whatever the
way prices are set, their behaviour mimics what happens in an economy where UNS is
important.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section critically reviews
the way Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) measure the signi￿cance of time-dependent price
setting mechanisms. In Section 3 we use the results in Dias et al: (2005) to obtain a mea-
sure of the importance of time-dependent price setting mechanisms implying UNS, and
suggest an alternative approach to this problem. Section 4 describes the data available
to us and provides the empirical results obtained with the di⁄erent measures. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2. MEASURING UNS: THE METHOD OF KLENOW AND KRYVTSOV
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) proposed a simple and ingenious method to measure
the importance of time-dependent price setting mechanisms. Their method is based on
a decomposition of the variance of in￿ ation into two components. The ￿rst, depends
on the variance of the average magnitude of price changes and re￿ ects changes in the
intensive margin. The second, depends on the variance of the fraction of items changing
price and on the covariance between the magnitude of price changes and the fraction
of items changing price. Essentially, this second term captures changes in the extensive
margin.
Speci￿cally, let ￿t be the in￿ ation rate in period t and denote by ￿t the average rate of
price changes across all ￿rms in period t, conditional on a price change having occurred.
Furthermore, de￿ne E (￿t) = ￿ and E (￿t) = ￿. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) notice that
V ar[￿t] = V ar[￿t￿t] and therefore
V ar[￿t] = V ar[￿￿t + (￿t ￿ ￿)￿t]
= ￿
2V ar[￿t] + V ar[(￿t ￿ ￿)￿t] + 2Cov [￿￿t;(￿t ￿ ￿)￿t].
3Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) de￿ne ￿
2V ar[￿t] as the time-dependent component of
the in￿ ation variance because that would be the value of V ar[￿t] for ￿t = ￿. Given this
split of the variance of in￿ ation, Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) use the ratio between the






as a measure of the importance of time-dependent price setting schemes. In practice, an
estimator of ￿KK, say [ ￿KK, can be obtained by replacing in (1) ￿, V ar[￿t] and V ar[￿t]
by the respective sample counterparts.
At this point, it is important to carefully consider the meaning of ￿KK. Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2005, p:11) state that ￿
2V ar[￿t] captures changes in the intensive margin,
which account for all of the variation in in￿ ation in staggered time-dependent models.
However, it is important to notice that the type staggering that implies V ar[￿t] =
￿
2V ar[￿t] is UNS, for which ￿t = ￿, 8t.
The authors go on to claim that the other two terms involve changes in the extensive
margin, which only contribute in state-dependent models. However, time-dependent
models ￿ la Calvo (1983) also imply changes in the extensive margin because in these
models ￿t varies randomly around ￿. Therefore, these two other terms capture not only
the importance of state-dependent rules, but also the contribution for the variance of
the in￿ ation from time-dependent rules that do not imply UNS.
Therefore, at best, ￿KK is a measure of the importance (for the variance of the in-
￿ ation) of time-dependent price setting rules that imply UNS, rather than a measure of
the importance of time-dependent rules tout court. This view is in a way con￿rmed by
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005, pp: 11-12), who explicitly use this term in their variance
decomposition to draw conclusions about the importance of ￿ uctuation in ￿t, that is,
about the degree of UNS. However, the interpretation of ￿KK as a measure of the degree
of UNS is marred by some di¢ culties, which we now enumerate.2
2By de￿nition, the so-called time-dependent term in the variance decomposition of in￿ ation measures
the contribution of the variation in the average size of price changes (changes in the intensive margin)
to the variance of in￿ ation. Our criticism of ￿KK only applies to its use as a measure of the importance
41. Perhaps the more obvious ￿ aw of ￿KK is that it is not constrained to be in the [0;1]
interval. Indeed, if V ar[(￿t ￿ ￿)￿t] + 2Cov [￿￿t;(￿t ￿ ￿)￿t] < 0, then ￿KK > 1. In
particular, ￿KK = 1 for V ar[￿t] = 0. Consequently, ￿KK cannot be seen as a
proportion.
2. A related problem is that values of ￿KK close to 1 do not necessarily imply a
high degree of UNS. Indeed, for V ar[￿t] > 0, UNS implies ￿KK = 1 but the
converse is not true. Indeed, all that is required for ￿KK to be equal to 1 is that
V ar[(￿t ￿ ￿)￿t] + 2Cov [￿￿t;(￿t ￿ ￿)￿t] = 0.
3. The value of ￿KK depends on the mean of ￿t, which has little to do with the
importance of UNS. In particular, if ￿t is shifted by a constant, say ￿, the numerator
of ￿KK will remain constant, whereas the denominator becomes V ar[￿t￿t + ￿￿t],
which in general is di⁄erent from V ar[￿t￿t]
4. Finally, ￿KK also depends on the variance of ￿t. Speci￿cally, ￿KK tends to 0 when
V ar[￿t] passes to 0. In the limit, for constant ￿t, ￿KK will be zero, whether or
not UNS is important (as long as V ar[￿t] > 0). On the other hand, a pure state-
dependent economy, where the degree of UNS is zero, will not be characterized by
a value of ￿KK equal to zero (unless ￿t is constant).
These facts make clear that, by itself, the estimated value of ￿KK may have little to
do with the importance of UNS in the economy. In the particular application considered
by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005), these pitfalls of ￿KK are somewhat mitigated by the
fact that the covariance term is generally small. Nevertheless, the authors report some
values for their statistic which are higher than one, highlighting the di¢ culties with its
interpretation.3 In other applications, there is no guarantee that the covariance term
will be negligible and therefore the use of ￿KK requires some caution.
The source of the problems with ￿KK can be traced back to the fact that a ratio
measuring the importance for the variance of in￿ ation of changes in the intensive margin
of the degree of UNS, and not to its use as a measure of the importance of changes in the intensive
margin to the variance of in￿ ation.
3Below, we provide an example in which [ ￿KK = 1:30.
5is being interpreted as a measure of the importance of UNS. This makes ￿KK dependent
on characteristics of the economy (e.g., V ar[￿t]) which are only indirectly related to
the topic of interest, viz., the ￿ uctuations in the fraction of items changing price. Given
these limitations of ￿KK as a measure of UNS, it is interesting to study alternative forms
of gauging the importance of this type of price setting rules.
3. MEASURING UNS: OTHER METHODS
Rather than measuring the importance of UNS by its contribution to the variance of
the in￿ ation, here we follow Dias et al: (2005) and evaluate the importance of UNS by
the proportion of prices in the economy that are set using time-dependent rules that
imply UNS. Of course, these new statistics will not allow us to measure the contribution
of UNS for the variance of in￿ ation, but they have the advantage of depending only on
the variability of ￿t.
As in Dias et al: (2005), suppose that the economy is characterized by a mixture of
two types of ￿rms. Firms of type 1 are characterized by UNS, with a ￿xed proportion
of ￿rms adjusting their prices every period (as in Taylor, 1980, p: 4). Let ￿ denote the
proportion of ￿rms of type 1 in the economy and de￿ne ￿1 as the fraction of this type
of ￿rms that adjust their prices in a given period. For type 2 ￿rms, UNS does not hold
and therefore the share of these ￿rms that adjusts their prices in period t varies. Let
st denote the proportion of type 2 ￿rms that change prices in period t. Under these
circumstances, ￿t, the fraction of prices that change in period t for the whole economy
is given by4
￿t = ￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)st. (2)
This model for ￿t nests two polar cases. For ￿ = 1, the economy is characterised by
UNS. On the other hand, for ￿ = 0, no price is set by time-dependent rules implying UNS.
We take the value of ￿ as a measure of the importance of price setting rules implying
UNS and, in what follows, we discuss how to obtain information on this parameter.
4To provide a link with the results of Klenow and Kryvstov (2005), it is interesting to notice that if
(2) is substituted into V ar[￿t], ￿ = 1 implies ￿KK = 1 for V ar[￿t] > 0.
63.1 The FK index
Dias et al: (2005) have studied the case in which ￿rms of type 2 have perfect price
synchronization as de￿ned by Fisher and Konieczny (2000).5 In this case, st is a Bernoulli
random variable with E(st) = ￿2, say. If, for simplicity, we assume that ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿, we
have E(￿t) = ￿ and V ar[￿t] = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
2. Dias et al: (2005) show that under these
assumptions the proportion of ￿rms with perfect price synchronization can be estimated
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￿,
with ￿ ￿ and V ar[^ ￿t] denoting respectively the sample mean and the sample variance of
^ ￿t (see Dias et al., 2005). Consequently, in this economy, the proportion of ￿rms whose
price setting behaviour is characterized by UNS can be estimated by d ￿FK = 1 ￿ FK.
Clearly, d ￿FK has some important advantages over [ ￿KK as a way of measuring the im-
portance of time-dependent price setting mechanisms with UNS. Indeed, besides having
a clear interpretation, it is restricted to the [0;1] interval. Moreover, unlike [ ￿KK, d ￿FK
does not depend on the properties of ￿t, the average rate of price changes in period t,
conditional on a price change having occurred.
Despite these attractive features, d ￿FK also has some drawbacks which are related to the
fact that it is based on a statistics whose purpose is to measure the degree of perfect price
synchronization rather than the degree of UNS. Indeed, if type 2 ￿rms are not perfectly
synchronized, st is a random variable with domain [0;1] rather than a Bernoulli variable
with support in f0;1g. In this case d ￿FK will be biased upwards because V ar[￿t] will be
smaller than ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
2. Since this is generally the case, d ￿FK should be viewed
as an upper bound on the proportion of ￿rms of type 1, rather than as an estimator of
this parameter. A related drawback is that, conditional on V ar[￿t], d ￿FK is a function
of ￿, whereas in the model ￿ is independent of ￿.
5That is, for ￿rms of type 2, in a given period either no ￿rm changes its price, or all ￿rms do it.
73.2 A nonparametric upper bound
More appropriate estimators of ￿ can be obtained if a more realistic hypothesis is
made about the behaviour of type 2 ￿rms. In particular, if the researcher is willing to
assume a di⁄erent distribution for st, ￿ can be easily estimated. Identi￿cation of ￿,
however, comes at a cost because the results are likely to be sensitive to the particular
choice of distribution. Nevertheless, it is possible to obtain useful information on the
degree of UNS without any further information on the distribution of st. Indeed, we now
show that it is possible to establish a nonparametric upper bound for ￿ which, besides
requiring only very mild assumptions, provides an alternative and interesting way of
measuring the degree of UNS.
If, in (2), st were indeed a Bernoulli variable, ￿t would only assume two values: ￿￿1
and ￿￿1+(1 ￿ ￿). In this case, ￿ could be obtained directly from the di⁄erence between
the two values assumed by ￿t. However, whatever the distribution of st, it must be the
case that 0 ￿ st ￿ 1. Consequently, ￿t can never be above ￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿) or below ￿￿1,
which implies that the range of ￿t must be smaller than the di⁄erence between these two
limits. That is,
maxf￿tg ￿ minf￿tg ￿ ￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ maxf￿tg + minf￿tg ￿ ￿.
This inequality leads to the following upper bound for ￿
￿U = 1 ￿ maxf￿tg + minf￿tg,









that this upper bound does not depend on the proportion of type 1 ￿rms changing prices
each period and, therefore, the assumption that ￿1 = ￿2 is not needed.
Although ￿U is just an upper bound for the proportion of ￿rms adopting time-
dependent price setting methods, it has several interesting properties. Indeed, it is
very simple to compute, it is restricted to the [0;1] interval and has a very clear interpre-
tation. Moreover, it has the advantage of being based on very mild assumptions. Since
8d ￿FK also provides an upper bound for ￿, it will be interesting to see, in practice, which
of the methods provides a tighter bound and how they compare to [ ￿KK.
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 The data
In this section we use three micro datasets on consumer and producer prices, all
collected by the Portuguese Instituto Nacional de Estat￿stica (INE), to compare and
evaluate the di⁄erent measures of UNS discussed before. Two of these datasets were
designed to produce the aggregate Consumer Price Index for Portugal and cover the
periods from January 1993 to December 1997 and from January 1998 to December 2000.
Hereafter, these two datasets will be referred to as CPI1 and CPI2, respectively. The
third dataset has information on producer prices at the ￿rm and product level, containing
the raw data underlying the Portuguese Production Price Index. This dataset covers the
period from January 1996 to December 2000 on a monthly basis and hereafter it will be
referred to as the IPPI dataset.
The CPI1 and CPI2, datasets contain information on prices at the outlet and product
level, covering outlets nationwide. The basic observation is that of a price of an item
in a particular outlet at a given point in time. This item is followed over time within
the same store. In both cases the sampling frequency is product-dependent, being either
yearly, quarterly or monthly.6 We excluded items observed on a yearly basis because
this information is too poor for our purposes. Furthermore, in order to use data on all
remaining items, we have opted for transforming monthly data into quarterly data. This
was done by randomly selecting one month (￿rst, second or third) in the quarter for each
monthly observed item and discarding the other two records for the entire observation
period. Products for which price trajectories are incomplete were discarded from CPI1
or CPI2 for estimation purposes.
6In CPI1 yearly, quarterly and monthly observations represent 1%, 51% and 48% of the consumer
bundle while in CPI2 these proportions are, respectively, 4%, 58% and 38%.
9It is worth mentioning that CPI1 and CPI2 share a similar longitudinal structure,
but are collected using di⁄erent criteria. The composition of the datasets at the product
level is determined using information on family expenditure patterns from the Portuguese
Family Income and Expenditure Surveys. Two di⁄erent surveys underlie CPI1 and CPI2,
thus introducing di⁄erences in composition between CPI1 and CPI2.
The IPPI dataset reports prices in industry for di⁄erent sectors but in this study
we focus on the Manufacturing industry. As for the CPI datasets, each observation
corresponds to the price of an item in a ￿rm at a given moment in time. The price
collected by INE is de￿ned as the list price of industrial goods traded within the domestic
market. Any discounts or subsidies are not deducted and taxes are not added. The
relevant price is the one in force at the 15th of each month. The sample covers ￿rms
that produce in part or totally for the domestic market. As with the CPI datasets,
incomplete price trajectories were discarded for estimation purposes.
4.2 Results
In order to obtain a rough estimate of the ability of models that imply UNS to describe
the price setting behaviour in the Portuguese economy, the three indicators presented
above were computed for the di⁄erent datasets we have available. The results are pre-
sented in Tables 1 and 2.7
The results in Table 1 highlight the di¢ culties in interpreting [ ￿KK. As mentioned
above, this estimator is not constrained to be in the [0;1] interval, and therefore it is
hard to give a meaningful interpretation to the results obtained with it8. In particular,
despite being close to one in most cases, we cannot conclude that the time-dependent
7Notice that in all empirical results presented in this paper ^ ￿t is computed as a weighted average of the
frequency of price changes in each product. The weights used are based on the Consumer Expenditure
Survey in the case of CPI and on the value of production in the case of IPPI. In the case of CPI, the
weights are de￿ned at the product￿region level while in the case of IPPI the weights are de￿ned at the
NACE 3 digits level.
8Notice, for instance, that for the "non-food" sector in case of CPI2, d ￿kK is equal to 1:30
10term dominates the in￿ ation variance. Moreover, as argued in section 2, it is also not
possible to draw any conclusion on the importance of UNS from the value [ ￿KK.
Table 1 - CPI results
CPI1: 1993 - 1997 CPI2: 1998 - 2000
# of Obs. [ ￿KK d ￿FK c ￿U # of Obs. [ ￿KK d ￿FK c ￿U
All goods 686520 0:74 0:90 0:78 570636 0:69 0:88 0:78
Food 309480 0:94 0:94 0:83 290076 1:02 0:92 0:85
Non-food 285960 0:62 0:86 0:70 201096 1:30 0:85 0:75
Services 91080 0:42 0:81 0:62 79464 0:62 0:80 0:68
Table 2 - IPPI results: 1996 - 2000
# of Obs. [ ￿KK d ￿FK c ￿U
All goods 478740 0:92 0:89 0:79
Intermediate 229080 0:74 0:84 0:72
Consumer 249180 0:95 0:89 0:80
Energy 480 0:84 0:57 0:13
The estimator for the upper-bound of the proportion of ￿rms characterized by UNS
based on the FK index suggests that UNS can be adequate to describe a large proportion
of price-setting decisions, both for CPI1 and CPI2. However, comparisons between the
values of d ￿FK for CPI1 and CPI2 are not very informative because, as noted above, ￿FK
is sensitive to the value of ￿ ￿ and the average of ^ ￿t is not equal in the two datasets.
The ￿rst point to notice about the results obtained using ￿U is that c ￿U is always
smaller than d ￿FK. Since both statistics are upper-bounds for the percentage of ￿rms
characterized by UNS, we conclude that in this example the bound provided by ￿U
is tighter than the one provided by d ￿FK. The values of c ￿U provide further evidence
suggesting that UNS may indeed be able to describe a large proportion of price-setting
decisions in the Portuguese economy.
Turning now to the results in Table 2, we ￿nd that, again, c ￿U is always smaller than
d ￿FK. This di⁄erence is particularly noticeable for the case of Energy where the estimated
11upper-bound for the fraction of ￿rms following UNS is only 0:13.9 Despite the noticeable
di⁄erences across the various sectors, these results also suggest that an important part
of the price-setting decisions are compatible with UNS. Moreover, it is worth noticing
that the overall results for d ￿FK and c ￿U are remarkably close in all data sets, whereas
[ ￿KK has some important ￿ uctuations.
In short, we conclude that although there is evidence to suggest that time-dependent
price setting schemes implying UNS may be quite important, the strength of this evidence
very much depends on the measure of UNS that is used. These conclusions are not speci￿c
of the Portuguese economy. Using the data for the U.S: that was studied by Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2005), the results of the three measures of UNS are as follows: [ ￿KK = 0:96,
d ￿FK = 0:94 and c ￿U = 0:80.
The ￿ndings in this section suggest that UNS may adequately describe a large propor-
tion of price setting decisions. However, using the test suggested by Dias et al: (2005), the
hypothesis that uniform nonsynchronization provides an adequate description of price
setting behaviour in the whole economy was clearly rejected (p-values smaller than 0:000)
for all the 12 cases considered. Again, a similar result is found using the CPI data for
the U.S: studied by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005).
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
For di⁄erent reasons, the use of [ ￿KK and d ￿FK to gauge the importance of UNS can be
very misleading. Therefore, c ￿U, the new measure of UNS proposed in Section 3, can be
an interesting additional tool as it has a clear interpretation and is very easy to compute.
Unlike [ ￿KK, c ￿U does not measure the contribution of time-dependent price setting rules
characterized by UNS for the variance of in￿ ation, but rather provides an upper bound
for the proportion of prices that are set using rules leading to UNS. In the examples in
section 4, c ￿U provides an upper bound for this proportion which is much tighter than
the one given by d ￿FK.
9During the period under analysis the prices of energetic goods in the producer were not subject to
any form of regulation, being derived mainly by oil prices and exchange rate ￿ uctuations.
12In view of these results, it would be interesting to see how sensitive to the choice of UNS
measure is the conclusion that models based on time-dependent price setting mechanisms
and appropriately calibrated state-dependent models, lead to similar conclusions. This
task is, however, beyond the scope of the present work.
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